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Abstract 
The essay’s starting point is Shelley’s conviction that poetry ‘marks the before 
unapprehended relations of things’ and his consequent way of using ‘words’ in his 
prose as ‘pictures of integral thoughts’, even as he worries that they may turn out to be 
merely ‘signs for portions and classes of thoughts’ (A Defence of Poetry). The essay 
shows how Shelley’s prose thinks through its style in multiple ways: section 2 
examines the ironies at work in ‘An Address to the People on the Death of the 
Princess Charlotte’; section 3 turns its attention to A Philosophical View of Reform 
and that work’s enactment of complicated rhetorical strategies; section 4 examines 
Shelley’s essays on religious matters, such as his essay ‘On Christianity’, and brings 
out their concern to dramatize and allow for tensions; and section 5 explores Shelley’s 
metaphysical prose before returning to questions of poetics with which the essay 
began. 
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‘Pictures’ and ‘Signs’ 
Creative Thinking in Shelley’s Prose, 1816–21 
Michael O’Neill 
In a passage from A Defence of Poetry (1821), to which this essay will return at its 
close, Shelley traces a seemingly inevitable process by which language loses its initial 
energy of metaphorical life. Of ‘poets’ he declares: 
Their language is vitally metaphorical; that is, it marks the before 
unapprehended relations of things, and perpetuates their apprehension, 
until the words which represent them become through time signs for 
portions and classes of thoughts, instead of pictures of integral thoughts; 
and then, if no new poets should arise to create afresh the associations 
which have been thus disorganized, language will be dead to all the 
nobler purposes of human intercourse.1 
It is for providing ‘pictures of integral thoughts’ that Shelley values ‘vitally 
metaphorical’ language, for imaging thoughts as accessible and entire entities rather 
than as ‘signs’. But in fact he is able to turn the entropic decline from ‘pictures’ to 
‘signs’ to his creative advantage. In an immediate upswing, the ‘nobler purposes’ 
referred to here as involved in the discovery of ‘new relations’ find their advocate in 
Bacon, who is said to speak of the likenesses found by the poet as ‘the same footsteps 
of nature impressed upon the various subjects of the world’.2 
* * * 
The fear that language will grow ‘disorganized’ and the need for poets to ‘create 
afresh’ weave in and out of one another. It is because of this fear and this need that 
‘Apprehension’, in Ross Wilson’s words, ‘itself must be alive’.3 Language’s very 
frailty and inadequacy—Shelley’s sense, as he puts it in one of his brief, fragmentary 
‘Speculations on Morals and Metaphysics’, that ‘Our words are dead, our thoughts are 
cold & borrowed’, or that ‘Words are the instruments of mind . . . , but they are not 
mind, nor are they portions of mind’—provide the tinder which ignites his prose into 
eloquent, counter-active flame.4 That sense of language’s deficiencies helps to explain 
why his prose is that of a poet, concerned, like Plato, ‘to kindle a harmony in 
thoughts’,5 aware that ‘harmony’ involves both a necessary awareness of the 
possibility of discord and a commitment to the imagination: ‘there is a principle 
within the human being . . . which acts otherwise than in the lyre, and produces not 
melody alone, but harmony’.6 Harmony involves responsiveness and adjustment, a 
thinking through the language being used, with a full recognition of its constraints and 
possibilities, and a strong awareness that meaning is being wrought into glowing but 
provisional being in the act of ‘communicating and receiving intense and impassioned 
conceptions respecting man and nature’, Shelley’s account of what poetry is towards 
the end of A Defence of Poetry.7 His attunement to the literary quality of thinking is a 
major reason why, as James Donelan has it in a recent review, ‘Shelley has long 
defied attempts to create a systemic account of his thought in criticism.’8 
A central argument in this essay, which draws examples from Shelley’s 
metaphysical, political, religious, and literary critical writings between 1816 and 
1821, is that his prose, like his verse, is poetic to the degree that it builds on his belief, 
ably explored by William Keach, that ‘language is arbitrarily produced by the 
Imagination and has relation to thoughts alone’.9 On Life (1819), conscripted by Earl 
Wasserman as a solution to various philosophical conundrums, works more as a prose 
poem, a reverie on a word, than as a philosophical mini-treatise, though it does 
include a review of Shelley’s early philosophical allegiances. Logic and rhetoric are at 
the service of a sense of wonder. ‘Life, the great miracle, we admire not, because it is 
so miraculous.’10 There, ‘because’ mocks the quasi-causal explanation it offers. 
Thinking about a word—‘life’—leads the essay to contemplate what it will call ‘that 
verge where words abandon us, and what wonder if we grow dizzy to look down the 
dark abyss of—how little we know’.11 Words mime their impulse to ‘abandon us’ 
through an assonantal off-chime between ‘abandon’ and ‘wonder’, and through a full 
rhyme between ‘we grow dizzy’ and ‘how little we know’ (emphases added). Such 
effects suggest an acute linguistic self-awareness at the very moment that Shelley 
imagines words leaving us in the lurch. 
Throughout On Life, to be reduced to ignorance is to be saved from ‘an education 
of error’, caused by the mind’s misplaced confidence in structures that it imposes on 
itself through ‘the misuse of words and signs, the instruments of its own creation’.12 
In its place, Shelley works to persuade us and himself of an idealism which he sees as 
creating a vacancy to be filled with imaginings that take their life and newness from 
the view that ‘nothing exists but as it is perceived’ and the counter-view that ‘Mind . . 
. cannot create, it can only perceive’.13 But the essay achieves its own creativity 
through its continual assaults on common understanding, including the use of words 
to suspend the meanings normally associated with them. The following passage 
allows one to see how Shelley manages such an assault and such a suspension: 
Pursuing the same thread of reasoning, the existence of distinct 
individual minds, similar to that which is employed in now questioning 
its own nature, is likewise found to be a delusion. The words, I, you, 
they, are not signs of any actual difference subsisting between the 
assemblage of thoughts thus indicated, but are merely marks employed 
to denote the different modifications of the one mind. . . . The words I, 
and you and they are grammatical devices invented simply for 
arrangement and totally devoid of the intense and exclusive sense 
usually attributed to them. It is difficult to find terms adequately to 
express so subtle a conception as that to which the intellectual 
philosophy has conducted us. We are on that verge where words 
abandon us, and what wonder if we grow dizzy to look down the dark 
abyss of—how little we know.  
The relations of things remain unchanged by whatever system.14 
‘Pursuing the same thread of reasoning’; ‘questioning its own nature’: thought is an 
active process, ongoing, living by and in the present participles that it generates. In 
proposing that ‘the words I and you and they are grammatical devices invented simply 
for arrangement and totally devoid of the intense and exclusive sense usually 
attributed to them’, Shelley intimates that ‘life’ is wholly different from the ‘multitude 
of entangled thoughts’15 which constitutes common-sense mental experience. Instead, 
he uses the fiction of his own individuality to propose, through a style that questions 
the validity of ‘grammatical devices’, the truth of ‘the one mind’. Here the fact that 
language is a common property rather than the possession of an individual cleverly 
supports his argument, an argument that takes him with poetic rigour into a place 
where he contends that ‘the existence of distinct individual minds similar to that 
which is employed in now questioning its own nature, is . . . found to be a delusion’. 
The ‘one mind’ is a duplicitously uncertain and suggestive notion. It may be related to 
‘the popular notion in critical works of the period of “the public mind” . . . an 
atmosphere of common opinion within which all think and act’, which Timothy Clark 
suggestively offers as a gloss. At the same time, it points towards a concept that jars 
with any idea of ‘common opinion’.16 For Shelley, language imagines the abolition of 
distinctions which it seems crucially part of linguistic structures to sustain. His words 
perform a serendipitous trick: they convey the idea of a ‘distinct individual mind’ 
(which from a strictly philosophical perspective is ‘a delusion’) and they adumbrate 
an all-subsuming yet elusive ‘one mind’ from which the writer is debarred by his 
individuality and to which he is connected by language. Indeed, to the degree that 
language embraces, formulates, and refigures the idea of the ‘one mind’, it comes 
close to being its sole witness and guarantor.17 
Writing becomes a discovery of the truth of one’s own phantasmal absence, when 
presence is the dubious or ‘delusory’ gift of the ‘popular philosophy’,18 yet writing, 
relying on and displaying what Jonathan Culler calls ‘the power of its own 
evocativeness’,19 is also the locus of a new freedom. The urbane rider—‘The relation 
of things remains unchanged by whatever system’—shows Shelley playing with 
words for a serious purpose: to free the mind from its own constructions. Language, 
Shelley’s words persuade us, is veil and pointer to what lies beyond the veil. In 
Wasserman’s words, language reveals to Shelley that ‘There is a veil between 
Existence and Seeming, and although we can construct philosophically for ourselves 
the undifferentiated unity that is the nature of Existence, we cannot avoid the fact that 
we live an illusion and cannot experience Existence directly.’20 Yet this gloss suggests 
the dismay of the virtuous philosopher; what delights the chameleonic prose-poet is a 
conceptual restlessness that dizzies the mind gazing into the abyss. 
* * * 
Shelley’s prose thinks through its style in multiple ways, as in the cunning rhetoric of 
his essay An Address to the People on the Death of the Princess Charlotte (1817). The 
essay thinks allusively and by indirections. It opens by referring to the death of 
Princess Charlotte in childbirth on 6 November 1817, which it will then link to the 
execution of the ‘Pentridge Three’: Jeremiah Brandreth, Isaac Ludlam, and William 
Turner, hanged and drawn ‘for treasonable utterances and actions which they had 
been entrapped into making and performing by a Government agent provocateur 
going by the name of William Oliver’.21 As Martin Priestman has observed, Shelley 
begins with an unignorable echo of Wordsworth’s ‘A slumber did my spirit seal’:22 
‘The Princess Charlotte is dead. She no longer moves, nor thinks, nor feels. She is as 
inanimate as the clay with which she is about to mingle.’23 Summoning up 
Wordsworth’s poem, Shelley makes us wonder whether the dead princess lives on, 
her life spirit transfused into some new creation: the residual effect of alluding to a 
poem that refers to ‘a thing that could not feel / The touch of earthly years’.24 From 
the essay’s beginning, Shelley seeks to democratize and extend the reach of affective 
rhetoric, paraphrasing Shylock in the second of his roman-numbered paragraphs (the 
roman numbers a touch that lends the piece an air of funeral dignity) as he speaks on 
behalf of ‘thousands of the poorest poor’: ‘And have they no affections? Do not their 
hearts beat in their bosoms, and the tears gush from their eyes? Are they not human 
flesh and blood? Yet none weep for them—none mourn for them—none when their 
coffins are carried to the grave (if indeed the parish furnishes a coffin for all) turn 
aside and moralize upon the sadness they have left behind.’25 
Through such allusive means, what seemed initially to be a lament for a young 
princess turns into a virtuosic exercise in polemic. Shelley’s skill in a polemical vein 
is evident from an early stage, as in Queen Mab (1813). Yet, as with other texts 
explored in this essay, An Address to the People demonstrates Shelley’s developing 
ability to write successfully by thinking through the meanings of tropes and expected 
phrases. In An Address to the People, such thinking continues until the mourned-for 
royal figure turns out, at the very end of the piece, to be the ‘Spirit of Liberty’ (see the 
extract). The close of the essay works cumulatively: 
XI. Mourn then People of England. Clothe yourselves in solemn black. 
Let the bells be tolled. Think of mortality and change. Shroud yourselves 
in solitude and the gloom of sacred sorrow. Spare no symbol of universal 
grief. Weep—mourn—lament. Fill the great City—fill the boundless 
fields, with lamentation and the echo of groans. A beautiful Princess is 
dead:—she who should have been the Queen of her beloved nation, and 
whose posterity should have ruled it forever. . . . LIBERTY is dead. 
Slave! I charge thee disturb not the depth and solemnity of our grief by 
any meaner sorrow. If One has died who was like her that should have 
ruled over this land, like Liberty, young, innocent, and lovely, know that 
the power through which that one perished was God, and that it was a 
private grief. . . . Let us follow the corpse of British Liberty slowly and 
reverentially to its tomb: and if some glorious Phantom should appear, 
and make its throne of broken swords and sceptres and royal crowns 
trampled in the dust, let us say that the Spirit of Liberty has arisen from 
its grave and left all that was gross and mortal there, and kneel down and 
worship it as our Queen.26 
The style is one of solemn funeral performance, almost verging on parody: ‘Clothe 
yourselves in solemn black. Let the bells be tolled. Think of mortality and change.’ 
There is a faint, unmistakable flicker of something sardonic in ‘Spare no symbol of 
universal grief’ or in the triple run of imperatives: ‘Weep—mourn—lament’. All these 
are actions, the prose makes one feel, which a person might play; the passage adapts 
and resourcefully exploits the language of processional elegy.27 It is as though Shelley 
were casting a cold eye on the capacity of his audience to be manipulated by 
language. Simultaneously he engages in exactly that, a process of manipulating his 
audience, as he moves towards the subversion of his climax: this is no young princess 
for whom sentimental dolour is being prescribed; it is an abstraction. Priestman 
cannily reads the ‘public lamentation for Charlotte as the unconscious expression of a 
deeper suffering, which Shelley is bringing to the surface almost like a 
psychoanalyst’.28 Shelley corporealizes an abstraction as though Liberty were the 
princess, but he works to make us grieve for an abstraction as though it had a reality 
even greater than a person. One of his manoeuvres is to interrupt the prose after the 
assertion that ‘LIBERTY is dead’ with a peremptory address: ‘Slave! I charge thee 
disturb not the depth and solemnity of our grief by any meaner sorrow.’ Peter 
McDonald finds in Shelley’s use of the word ‘slave’ an inability or a refusal to see 
that the word names ‘a reality of servitude and suffering’, but the word effects, in 
context, a salutary shock: there is ‘a reality of servitude and suffering’ in Shelley’s 
England, and one of its traces is subjugation to the ideology of monarchy, an ideology 
that is at once unreal trappings and ceremony, and basis for an only too real state of 
injustice.29 Those who mourn for Princess Charlotte and are indifferent to the death of 
Liberty are enslaved to an unjust political system responsible for the suffering of 
thousands. 
Shelley’s task is to bring home to his reader the recognition that Auden will 
embody in sonnet XVI from his sequence ‘In Time of War’, both that human beings, 
‘unlike an idea, can die too soon’ and that ‘ideas can be true although men die’ so that 
‘we can watch a thousand faces / Made active by one lie’.30 Auden claimed to dislike 
Shelley, recasting Shelley’s own Rasselas-derived formulation at the close of A 
Defence of Poetry: ‘“The unacknowledged legislators of the world” describes the 
secret police, not the poets.’31 But there is an affinity between the writers in their 
fascination with the relationship between lived experience and ideas. We live the lives 
we lead because of the thoughts we think. 
At the close of An Address to the People, Shelley’s prose is haunted by the fact 
that the language of a certain kind of poetic prose falls in with the language of power, 
to adapt a famous axiom from Hazlitt’s essay on Coriolanus, published as part of 
Characters of Shakespear’s Plays in 1817 and, in part, in The Examiner in 1816, and 
thus likely to be an important point of reference for Shelley’s essay. Hazlitt remarks 
that ‘The cause of the people is indeed but little calculated as a subject of poetry; it 
admits of rhetoric, which goes into argument and explanation, but it presents no 
immediate or distinct images to the mind.’32 Shelley implies, through his practice, 
agreement with Hazlitt’s proto-Yeatsian distinction between ‘rhetoric’ and ‘poetry’.33 
Yet that distinction is itself the matter for thought in Shelley’s prose. Thinking 
through style is thinking about style for Shelley, as his pamphlet’s Paineite epigraph 
indicates: ‘We pity the plumage, but forget the dying bird.’34 That is Tom Paine, 
mocking Burke’s high-flown grief for the fate of Marie Antoinette and the aristocracy, 
but showing how attacks on rhetoric can themselves end up tangled up in rhetoric, 
figurality. To understand Paine’s point we have to realize that the plumage is 
aristocratic show and display, and the dying bird is the people for whom Burke cannot 
be bothered to shed a tear, but the metaphor has oddly, inconsequentially organic 
implications, suggesting, surely against Paine’s conscious intention, a living or dying 
link between plumage and bird. 
Shelley fuses common feeling with hints that we risk complicity in unthinkingly 
dangerous over-emotionalism: so, Paine’s ‘He pities’ is altered to ‘We pity’. As 
Michael Scrivener has argued, Shelley avoids a ‘new sentimentality, because the 
suffering he laments can be changed’.35 Throughout, Shelley plays daring games with 
different ‘voices’, in part because, as Scrivener also notes, ‘he wished to reach a 
popular audience’,36 but also because he is deploying words to subvert preconceptions 
and inviting us to ‘create afresh’ our political thinking. The push at the end towards 
what Scrivener calls a ‘republican’ rather than ‘moderate’ language accompanies a 
modulated switch into future-based allegorizing, as, anticipating the close of ‘England 
in 1819’, Shelley writes of the possible appearance of ‘some glorious Phantom’.37 
Any harmony that emerges from An Address derives from calculated dissonances. 
So, the ‘glorious Phantom’, where Shelley appears to be playing on, mocking and 
revising the idea of the ‘glorious Revolution’, will ‘make its throne of broken swords 
and sceptres and royal crowns’. Shelley employs a tactic of redirected suggestion. The 
anti-monarchical figure of Liberty cannot for Shelley be imagined but through the 
language of what it (Liberty) opposes: thrones, royal crowns, and so forth. Steven 
Jones makes the point that Shelley uses ‘the devices of accelerating syntax, vivid 
imagery, and linguistic substitution as one thing replaces another in rapid succession: 
Liberty replaces the future Queen, ‘a “spirit” replaces a corpse, a vital ideal replaces a 
moribund institution, the Crown’.38 Yet the replacements are ghosted by the problems 
as well as the opportunities of opportunist rhetoric (‘let us say’) and the felt need to 
use the language of the enemy: ‘kneels down and worship it’. 
* * * 
Itself ‘broken’ or breaking and redeploying the other side’s weapons, embattled and 
conflict-aware, sometimes conflicted, Shelley’s language retains a near-sardonic 
reflexivity in its deployment of a kind of republican sublimity or Utopian futurity. 
Part of Shelley is forever battling with what he takes to be illusory or self-deceiving 
modes of thinking embedded in the language of politics.39 His deliberated yet 
explosive assault in A Philosophical View of Reform (1819–20) on ‘the ‘aristocracy of 
attorneys and excisemen, and directors, and government pensioners, usurers, stock 
jobbers, country bankers, with their dependants and descendants’ is part of a wider, 
deeper consideration—one in which the reader may discern covert self-involvement—
of why an aristocracy exists at all.40 Shelley treats this second aristocracy with the 
disdain of someone who belongs to the first aristocracy; he says of the group of 
‘attorneys and excisemen’ and so forth that ‘These are a set of pelting wretches in 
whose employment there is nothing to exercise, even to their distortion, the more 
majestic faculties of the soul.’41 In context, the echo of King Lear is divided in 
impact: ‘Poor naked wretches, whereso’er you are, / That bide the pelting of this 
pitiless storm,’ exclaims Lear on the heath.42 Shelley sees the attorneys, excisemen 
and others as injurers and victims by virtue of the peculiarly compressed nature of his 
allusive texture. 
In thinking about ‘aristocracy’, Shelley takes a haughtily detached view: 
‘Mankind seem to acquiesce, as in a necessary condition of the imbecility of their own 
will and reason, in the existence of an aristocracy.’43 This view builds on what might 
be called a linguistic history of the class: ‘Since usage has consecrated a distortion of 
the word aristocracy from its primitive meaning, let me be allowed to employ the 
word aristocracy in that ordinary sense which signifies that class of persons who 
possess a right to the labour of others, without dedicating to the common service any 
labour in return.’44 The existence of such a ‘class of persons’, Shelley goes on, ‘is a 
prodigious anomaly in the social system’.45 The ‘primitive meaning’ must be 
something like ‘best power’, ‘best citizens’, and one notes how Shelley harps on ‘the 
word aristocracy’, the phrase repeated twice, as though the author were intent on 
disarming it of its fascination while conceding, in the process of doing so, that the 
word is fascinating, needs to be disarmed. If it is disarmed, it is so by Shelley’s very 
particular use of that species of subversive paraphrase he has already used in relation 
to the aristocracy as embodying ‘in truth the interests of the rich’.46 He goes on, there, 
to argue that ‘Monarchy is only the string which ties the robber’s bundle’ in one of his 
sharp descents into a Cobbett-like, scornfully plain English.47 But he is conscious that 
there is, in the word, something 
to exercise, even to their distortion, the more majestic faculties of the 
soul. Though at the bottom it is all trick, there is something frank and 
magnificent in the chivalrous disdain of infamy connected with a 
gentleman. There is something to which—until you see through the base 
falsehood upon which all inequality is founded—it is difficult for the 
imagination to refuse its respect, in the faithful and direct dealings of the 
substantial merchant. But in the habits and lives of this new aristocracy 
created out of an increase [in] the public calamities, and whose existence 
must be determined by their termination, there is nothing to qualify our 
disapprobation.48 
As indicated above, what follows suggests that Shelley ultimately feels that he is 
making a distinction without a real difference: the combined effects of both forms of 
aristocracy are harmful and unfair. But though his somethings and his nothing blend 
as well as clash, he engages in a drama of thought, a rehearsal of the arguments, a 
giving way in incidentals if not in main substance to a Burkean position, an 
acknowledgement that, in politics, faculties of soul and imagination have their place, 
cannot be wholly disregarded, must be attended to, if the ‘trick’ to which they often 
succumb is to be explained and exposed. 
In A Philosophical View of Reform, arguing that ‘That equality in possessions 
which Jesus Christ so passionately taught is a moral rather than political truth,’49 
Shelley asserts: 
We may and ought to advert to it, as to the elementary principle, as to 
the goal, unattainable perhaps by us, but which, as it were, we revive in 
our posterity to pursue. We derive tranquillity and courage and grandeur 
of soul from contemplating an object which is, because we will it, and 
may be, because we hope and desire it, and must be, if succeeding 
generations of the enlightened sincerely and earnestly seek it.50  
This is a rhythm typical of Shelley’s prose: one might call it, with the last stanza of 
Prometheus Unbound in mind, hope creating from its own wreck the thing it 
contemplates. The movement from the ideal that ‘is, because we will it’ to one that 
‘may be, because we hope and desire it’ to one that ‘must be, if succeeding 
generations . . . seek it’ is stirring but also alert to the dynamics of will, hope, and 
desire. Momentarily the far-off ideal is made to seem the only possible goal we should 
seek to attain. However, the subsequent turn is also characteristic of Shelley: ‘But our 
present business is with the difficult and unbending realities of actual life, and when 
we have drawn inspiration from the great object of our hope it becomes us with 
patience and resolution to apply ourselves to accommodating our theories to 
immediate practice.’51 Shelley’s prose audibly knuckles under here, ‘accommodating’ 
itself to ‘the difficult and unbending realities of actual life’, where all three adjectives 
earn their keep: ‘difficult’ suggesting the need for realism, ‘unbending’ indicating the 
nature of the difficulties, and ‘actual’ implying a distinction between where we are 
and where we would like to be, seen as ‘unattainable’. The braced way in which the 
sentence takes the strain of its realization, however, indicates the author’s 
unwillingness to let go of the ‘inspiration’ to be ‘drawn . . . from the great object of 
our hope’. 
* * * 
Shelley’s religious prose, prose which has as its main theme the ultimate spiritual 
destiny of human beings, reveals a comparable double rhythm. Often its finest 
moments involve a turn, or a redefinition, a mobile life in the process of writing that is 
equivalent to that ‘living by ideas’ which Arnold praises in ‘That return of Burke 
upon himself’ in Burke’s Thoughts on French Affairs.52 Examples occur in On 
Christianity (1817), a work that is at once critical of ‘the gross imaginations of the 
vulgar relatively to the ruling Power of the universe’ and surprisingly, if one thinks of 
Shelley as authoring The Necessity of Atheism (1811), interested in trying to define 
‘God’ as ‘the interfused and overruling Spirit of all the energy and wisdom included 
within the circle of existing things’.53 That ‘acceptation’ of the term keeps in play 
various possibilities:54 ‘the circle of existing things’ sounds a materialist note, while 
‘interfused and overruling Spirit’ in Spinozist mode balances the pantheist and 
spiritual. Other definitions in the work swing between the humanist and the quasi-
transcendental, before a perilous harmony emerges. The humanist perspective shines 
through the comment that the person who ‘only aspires to that which the divinity of 
his own nature shall consider and approve .. he, has already seen God’.55 This 
emphasis, with its reworking of traditional usages, immediately passes into shifts and 
reconsiderations: ‘We live and move and think, but we are not the creators of our own 
origin and existence . . . There is a Power by which we are surrounded, like the 
atmosphere in which some motionless lyre is sustained, which visits with its breath 
our silent chords at will.’56 Beginning with a complex echo of Acts 17:28  that 
acknowledges dependence on a higher power, even if that power may be internal, it 
seems no accident that this different sense of God (Shelley will go on to say ‘This 
power is God’) is inextricable from an account of poetic inspiration.57 Later Shelley 
will shift into a more conceptual mode, as he brings humanity and God into 
alignment, asserting that ‘The perfection of the human and the divine character is thus 
asserted to be the same’, though at this stage he is paraphrasing Jesus’s teaching.58 In 
offering its own account of Christ’s teaching, the essay gives itself room to explore 
Shelley’s own thinking, while allowing for a gap between the two. And not just 
Shelley’s thinking; thought here is deeply entangled with hope and desire: 
We die, says Jesus Christ; and, when we awaken from the languor of 
disease, the glories and the happiness of Paradise are around us. All evil 
and pain have ceased for eve ... Our happiness also corresponds with and 
is adapted to, the nature of … what is most excellent in our being. We 
see God, and we see that he is good. How delightful a picture even if it 
be not true! How magnificent and illustrious is the conception which this 
bold theory suggests to the contemplation, even if it be no more than the 
imagination of some sublimest and most holy poet, who, impressed with 
the loveliness and majesty of his own nature, is impatient, discontented, 
with the narrow limits which this imperfect life, and the dark grave have 
assigned forever as his melancholy portion.59  
The passage plays the delights of hope against a sober sense of likely reality in the 
exclamatory ‘How delightful a picture even if it be not true!’ A doubleness of feeling 
courses through the writing. So, the phrase ‘no more than the ‘imagination of some 
sublimest and most holy poet’ typifies the subtlety that pervades the writing; beneath 
sadness at the sway exercised by the reality principle is a final twist that suggests that 
the matter is seen as it is because of ‘narrow limits’. The reader is pulled between 
melancholy and a recognition of the value of the ‘imagination of some sublimest and 
most holy poet’. The final effect, that is, of ‘the narrow limits which this imperfect 
life, and the dark grave have assigned forever as his melancholy portion’ is as much 
protesting rejection as acquiescence. Gavin Hopps is persuasive when he argues that 
‘What we can see here, then, is the poet yearning in spite of himself for something he 
can’t quite allow himself to believe in, which in turn won’t allow his disbelief 
sovereignty either.’60 If the writing bears witness to a residually conflicted aspect to 
Shelley’s view of Christianity, it makes for prose that engages us in ways that 
theological and philosophical argument often fails to do. The text is knowingly scored 
through with longing and struggle. 
Shelley might seem to smuggle back into his discourse a wish to honour what 
Wallace Stevens calls, albeit in a poem denying transcendental aspirations, ‘the voice 
that is great within us’.61 Yet the Romantic prose poet can pitilessly dissect the 
workings of desire, as at the close of A Future State (1818) where the possibility of 
life after death is examined by a side of Shelley he must at least in part overcome in 
writing Adonais: 
This desire to be forever as we are, this reluctance to a violent and 
unexperienced change, which is common to all the animate and 
inanimate combinations of the universe, is indeed the secret persuasion 
which has given birth to the opinion of a future state.62 
It is because of ‘the desire to be forever as we are’ that we entertain the idea of what 
we cannot know; it is because of dislike of a ‘violent and unexperienced change’ that 
we play Pascalian wagers in the hope of experiencing what is unimaginable when 
confronted by what our senses tell us. The rough draft has more material after this, all 
of which is crossed out, as though Shelley realized that further investigation would 
destroy the ‘rondo’, to borrow Coleridge’s word,63 of an essay which opens, ‘It has 
been the persuasion of an immense majority of human beings in all ages and nations 
that we continue to live after death—that apparent termination of all the functions of 
sensitive and intellectual existence.’64 Yet the word ‘apparent’, which ushers in ‘all 
the functions’ as an annulling antithesis to ‘all ages and nations’, may undermine 
scepticism as much as it critiques credulity. A view is put which is at once 
unanswerable and finally inadequate, so that the topic feels unexhausted, ready to be 
reapproached. 
Shelley could not be more explicit about his wish to ‘bring the question to the test 
of experience and fact’ or to establish clearly what we understand ‘By the word 
death’.65 Yet this practice of careful examination wars with sudden eruptions of latent 
feeling: ‘When you can discover where the fresh colours of the faded flower abide, or 
the music of the broken lyre, seek life among the dead.’66 The sentence behaves as 
though it were describing an absurdity, but it rehearses one of the functions of literary 
imagination, its drive to relocate ‘The light that never was, on sea or land’, as 
Wordsworth calls it in ‘Elegiac Stanzas, Suggested by a Picture of Peele Castle’.67 
* * * 
Such essays are less philosophical meditations than poetic investigations of the drama 
of mind and heart, expressions of self-awareness about the elusiveness of self-
awareness. In one of the ‘Speculations on Metaphysics’ Shelley imagines the benefit 
that would accrue from a ‘faithful history’ of mental life, only to capture with 
precision the near-impossibility of introspection: 
If it were possible that a person should give a faithful history of his being 
from the earliest epochs of his recollection, a picture would be presented 
such as the world has never contemplated before. A mirror would be 
held up to all men in which they might behold their own recollections, 
and in dim perspective their shadowy hopes and fears,—all that they 
dare not, or that daring and desiring, they could not expose to the open 
light of day—But thought can with difficulty visit the intricate and 
winding chambers which it inhabits.—It is like a river whose rapid and 
perpetual stream flows outwards;—like one in dread who speeds 
through the recesses of some haunted pile and dares not look behind. 
The caverns of the mind are obscure and shadowy, or pervaded with a 
lustre, beautifully bright indeed, but shining not beyond their portals. If 
it were possible to be where we have been, vitally and indeed—if at the 
moment of our presence there we could define the results of our 
experience—if the passage from sensation to reflexion—from a state of 
[passive] to voluntary contemplation were not so dizzying and so 
tumultuous—this attempt would be less difficult.—68 
Merle A. Williams helpfully defines the passage as among the moments in Shelley’s 
prose ‘when philosophical registers elude him and he turns to allusive, metaphorical 
writing’.69 Shelley suggests that ‘thought’ may inhabit the chambers but it cannot visit 
them—and yet that is precisely what his prose seeks often to do, as here: to visit the 
chambers it inhabits. ‘If it were possible’ is a phrase repeated to evoke a yearning 
which is known to be unattainable. ‘If it were possible to be where we have been, 
vitally and indeed’, he writes, where ‘indeed’ recovers a full strength of meaning, 
suggesting the possibility of such dwelling as a ‘deed’.  The writing.  Implies, ‘in act’ 
and ‘vitally’, Shelley’s desire for his prose to live through its intensity of self-
perception. If he senses he cannot accomplish the task, it is because thought cannot 
pivot on itself; it is less a still point than an image for thought’s habit of streaming 
onwards. 
For Shelley, replaying Sternean comic anxieties in a near-Gothic mode, thought 
is forever flowing ‘like a river whose rapid and perpetual stream flows outwards; it is 
‘like one in dread who speeds through the recesses of some haunted pile and dares not 
look behind’, the writing absorbing overtones from a simile in Coleridge’s ‘The Rime 
of the Ancient Mariner’.70 Now thought is self-fearful, self-haunted, aware of ‘The 
caverns of the mind’ as ‘obscure and shadowy; or pervaded with a lustre, beautifully 
bright indeed, but shining not beyond their portals’. Shelley’s ‘self-experience in the 
act of thinking’ is often of this kind, one that brings out how ‘dizzying and 
tumultuous’ the passage is from ‘a state of passive to voluntary contemplation’. ‘The 
mind’s self-experience’ is Coleridge’s fine phrase in chapter 7 of Biographia 
Literaria, and comparison will bring out the difference between the two writers, 
Coleridge able to balance active and passive motions of the mind, Shelley thrown 
from one to the other, yet able to watch and relish the way in which his own 
imagination is brought into play.71 
Both authors want to convey the process of thought; but it is Shelley’s particular 
commitment to this process that makes the genre of the brief essay peculiarly right for 
his endless startings again, his tackling of the big little words: ‘love, life, death’, for 
example. In these essays, one finds, in Anthony Howe’s perceptive diagnosis, a 
‘coming together of the generalizing theoretical and emotively immediate casts of 
mind that are both strong (and often complementary) in Shelley’.72 Shelley’s essay On 
Love proposes as an ideal the self’s ‘discovery of its antitype’, an oddly 
unimpassioned phrase that quickly moves into something more impassioned without 
ever losing the sense that we are within the mind imagining love as a restless quest 
presided over by a force that will brook no ‘rest or respite’: ‘this is the invisible and 
unattainable point to which Love tends; and to attain which it urges forth the powers 
of man to arrest the faintest shadow of that without the possession of which there is no 
rest or respite to the heart over which it rules’.73 The conflict between ‘unattainable’ 
and ‘to attain which’ generates an undertow of pathos as the sentence mimics, almost 
remorselessly, a pursuit that is gloriously doomed from the start. 
Style at such moments functions as a mode of thought, moving beyond the 
language of empirical philosophy to a more inwardly impassioned and poetic form of 
enquiry, in accord with Shelley’s view that ‘We do not attend sufficiently to what 
passes within ourselves.’74 In A Defence of Poetry Shelley rejects the idea that a poet 
must rely on ‘metre, or a certain system of traditional forms of harmony and 
language’, and argues that ‘The distinction between poets and prose-writers is a 
vulgar error.’ He includes under the banner of poetry the writings of Plato, Cicero, 
and Bacon, contending that Plato ‘forebore to invent any regular plan of rhythm 
which would include, under determinate forms, the varied pauses of his style’. In any 
potential combat between ‘varied pauses’ and ‘determinate forms’ this judgement 
awards the victory to the former.75 
Shelley’s essay asks to be read not simply as a statement but rather as an exalted 
and energizing enactment. Responding to his friend Thomas Love Peacock’s wittily 
provocative dismissal in The Four Ages of Poetry of poetry as ‘the mental rattle that 
awakened the attention of intellect in the infancy of civil society’,76 Shelley defends 
poetry against rationalist critique by using an array of tropes, rhythmic devices, 
bewitching images—often proceeding less to clothe an idea in a figure than to abolish 
or question the binary division between thought and word. If there is a pull in earlier 
work by Shelley towards seeing words in a Lockean fashion, as, in Paul Fry’s 
phrasing, ‘arbitrary signs that obscure the pure essence of thought’, the import of A 
Defence is that again, to quote Fry, as he bends to his own ends a half-line from 
Prometheus Unbound (2.4.116), ‘the deep truth is not imageless but an image’.77 To 
return to the passage with which this essay began, poetry is ‘vitally metaphorical’; ‘it 
marks the before unapprehended relations of things and perpetuates their 
apprehension’, where the rapid dance of bunching, lengthening sound similarities 
duplicates the effort to perpetuate apprehension through metaphor. But the sentence 
goes on, mimicking in its syntactical falling away the semantic entropy it describes, to 
depict a deforming ‘until’: ‘until the words which represent them become through 
time signs for portions and classes of thoughts, instead of pictures of integral 
thoughts; and then if no new poets should arise to create afresh the associations which 
have been thus disorganized, language will be dead to all the nobler purposes of 
human intercourse’.78 
The ‘harmony in thoughts’ does not preclude shifts, collisions of perspective 
(between in Abrams’s terms) ‘two planes of thought in Shelley’s aesthetics—one 
Platonistic and mimetic, the other psychological and expressive—applied alternately, 
as it were’, as Abrams notes with an alertness to Shelley’s mobility of suggestion, ‘to 
each of the major topics under discussion’.79 Sometimes Shelley foregrounds this 
alternating, as when he teases us in and out of thought through a speedy interplay of 
complementary, near-contradictory images; ‘And whether it [poetry] spreads its own 
figured curtain or withdraws life’s dark veil from before the scene of things, it equally 
creates for us a being within our being.’80 That ‘or’ is also an ‘and’ since Shelley 
makes us recognize in the sentence the need for the ‘figured curtain’, a need present in 
the mention of the curtain and its alternative, ‘life’s dark veil’. The passage poses its 
conundrum with a nonchalance that is part of its meaning; whatever the precise nature 
of poetry’s truth claims, ‘it equally creates for us a being within our being’, permitting 
a second mode of existence. Through its syntax, imagery, interplay of sound and 
sense, Shelley’s prose, in A Defence and elsewhere, is essentially that of a poet. It 
‘creates afresh’, its style kindling an often complex ‘harmony in thoughts’. 
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